Abstract-The challenging characteristics of sensor nodes, including the constrained resources, the ad-hoc nature of their deployment and the vulnerability of wireless media, pose a need for unique security solutions. The advantages of Public Key Cryptography (PKC) for sensor network security are widely acknowledged and include resilience, scalability and decentralized management. Recent work has indicated that PKC is feasible in the wireless sensor network (WSN) environment, paving the way for many new security services and opportunities. However, the computational effort involved in performing PKC operations remains substantial. From an energy consumption perspective, it is imperative that the processing and communication resources be utilized only when required. To that end, PKC implementations are more vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, when compared to traditional security methods that require less resources. In particular, if a malicious party attacks a sensor node by repetitive requests to establish a key, the resources of the attacked node can be exhausted quite rapidly. In this paper, we propose a novel RSA-based framework for combating DoS attacks in WSN by ensuring that the malicious party will exhaust its resources prior to exhausting those of its counterparts. Under the proposed approach, the mathematical operations performed by the malicious party require two or three orders of magnitude more resources than those required by the attacked party. We also present three methodologies for establishing an ephemeral key, in which the proposed DoS mitigation mechanism is an embedded component. Implementation results on the Intel Mote 2 platform substantiate the clear advantages of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sensor network, as a network of embedded sensing systems, has been studied extensively since the late 90s. Considerable efforts have been directed towards making them trustworthy [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] . This is particularly true in health and military applications, where critical information is frequently exchanged among sensor nodes through insecure wireless media. Traditionally, security is often viewed as a stand-alone component of a system's architecture, for which a dedicated layer is employed. This separation is a flawed approach to network security, particularly in resourceconstrained, application-oriented sensor networks. In every application, the security of the system, both in terns of safeguarding against malicious attacks and resilience under malfunction, is a vital component. Although the area of network security has been studied for decades, the many unique characteristics of sensor networks have traditionally rendered direct application of existing solutions impractical. In particular, the following security considerations and requirements need to be taken into account in the context of sensor networks.
First, the ad-hoc nature and extreme dynamic environments, in which sensor networks reside, suggest that a prerequisite for achieving security is the ability to encrypt and decrypt confidential data among an arbitrary set of sensor nodes. For the same reason, the keys used for encryption and decryption should be established at the nodes instead of using keys generated off-line, prior to deployment. This is important in order to accommodate for the dynamics of the network, as well as the environment. If a communication channel is unavailable during a particular time frame, the protocol should adapt accordingly. The reliability of the links, which is closely related to the issue of channel dynamics, must be reflected by any sensor network protocol such that erroneous links do not jeopardize the integrity of the key generation process. Second, due to high node density, scalability is a primary concern. Ad-hoc formation of node clusters [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , hosting collaborative processing, has been a solution in achieving both fault tolerance and scalability. Consequently, an ad-hoc cluster of nodes is required to establish a joint secret key, and any solid key generation scheme must scale with respect to the number of nodes in a cluster. The third aspect pertains to the scarce energy resources, along with low computation capability, which are always important considerations in security solutions for sensor networks; there is a clear need for conserving energy on each node when adopting a security protocol. In addition to the efficient utilization of energy, its balanced consumption across the entire network should be viewed as a primary goal in an aim to prolong the network lifetime.
A fundamental requisite for security, other than providing data confidentiality and authentication, is Denial of Service (DoS) prevention. The computational effort involved in per-forming PKC calculations is substantial. From an energy consumption perspective, it is imperative that the processing and communication resources be utilized only when required. To that end, PKC implementations are more vulnerable to DoS attacks, when compared to traditional security methods that require less resources. In particular, if a malicious party attacks a sensor node by futile repetitive requests to establish a joint secret key, the resources of the attacked node will be exhausted quite rapidly. Combating DoS attacks is the last frontier to be conquered prior to making PKC deployment standard security practice in sensor networks.
This paper focuses on a public key cryptographic approach for mitigating DoS attacks in sensor networks. In particular, the computational asymmetry in RSA signature generation schemes is exploited to yield a resource-efficient authentication mechanism which helps overcome DoS attacks. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of public key cryptographic methodologies introduced for sensor network environments. In Section III, a description of Elliptic Curve Cryptography-based key generation and authentication schemes are provided. Section IV focuses on the proposed framework for DoS mitigation, which is embedded within the key establishment process. In Section V we provide implementation results, while in section VI the conclusions are drawn.
II. PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR SENSOR NETWORKS
A simple solution for key establishment has been proposed in the literature, in which a single network-wide shared key is used. However, the capture of a single node could easily reveal the network secret key. A current mainstream effort consists of random key pre-distribution [4] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , in which a different set of pre-established keys is issued to each node, thereby reducing the probability that capturing one node will jeopardize the entire network. A trivial key predistribution scheme is to allow each node to hold N -1 secret pairwise keys, each of which is known only to the node and to one of the other N -1 nodes (assuming there are N nodes in the network). However, the constrained memory resources and the difficulty in adding new nodes to the network limit the effectiveness of this general scheme.
Other researchers have extended the original notion of key pre-distribution to include a statistical element. In particular, methods such as those proposed in [14] assume that each sensor node receives a random subset of keys drawn from a large key pool. To agree on a key for communication, two nodes find one common key within their subsets and use that key as their shared secret key. Additional information, such as data concerning the position and/or geographical distribution ofthe sensor nodes, can be used to further improve the key predistribution concept [9] . However, these schemes only offer a partial solution with respect to scalability, cryptographic robustness and the ability to append and revoke security attributes. For example, scalability can be limited, since the probability of two or more nodes sharing a pre-distributed key decreases rapidly as the number of nodes increases. This results in a need for a key discovery process, in which nodes communicate with other nodes in order to identify a joint secret key -a process that necessitates additional resources.
The cryptographic robustness is also lacking in predistribution schemes, as reflected by two aspects: first, the use of static key rings, which are assigned to the nodes, do not facilitate dynamic key generation, i.e., the generation of a new secret key per session, thereby reducing the cryptographic strength offered; second, by capturing a node, an adversary party may be able to decrypt data exchanges between other nodes in the network (given that the nodes utilize keys that are present in the captured node).
The problems identified in key pre-distribution schemes triggered an in-depth study of public key cryptographic keyestablishment for sensor networks. Correspondingly, there has been a growing effort in promoting public-key cryptography in sensor networks [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] . Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [21] emerges as a suitable public key cryptographic foundation for sensor networks, providing high security for relatively small key sizes. Malan et al. [15] demonstrated an implementation of point by scalar multiplication over elliptic curves, which is the basic and most timeconsuming operation in ECC, on MICA2 motes [22] . Ning et al. [23] further improved the implementation performance by at least a factor of 5 using well-know optimization techniques. These recent results indicate that the execution of ECC operations in sensor nodes is feasible, with predictable improved performance.
A major theme in public key cryptographic applications concerns certification, which ensures the safe exchange of public keys. A Certification Authority (CA) issues a certificate, attesting to the connection between a user's public key and his ID. Verifying a certificate requires an explicit reference to the CA's public key. An authentication procedure, which is based on certification, therefore needs the following values: the user's public key, his ID, the certificate, and the CA's public key. The latter is considered to be universal and known to all parties, while the first three values are unique to each user.
To further improve the computational efficiency of the key establishment procedure, self-certified public key cryptography was proposed [24] , in which a user submits its ID along with its public key, but does not submit an explicit certificate, thereby reducing communication and management overheads. In identity-based systems [25] , the user's public key is its actual ID, which avoids the need for any public value other than the user's ID. Nevertheless, an explicit reference to the CA's public key is still required. In the context of key establishment, self certification means that the authentication of values submitted by the participating parties is inherently embedded within the process of generating the session key. This is in contrast to the case of explicit certification, whereby authenticity of the submitted values has to be verified prior to the actual generation of the joint session key. A well known self-certified key generation method is the MQV [26] , adopted by the NSA [27] .
III. ECC-BASED KEY GENERATION AND AUTHENTICATION A. Notation and Formulation
We begin by reviewing the foundations for ECC-based key generation and authentication, as introduced by the authors in [28] . Our mathematical foundations rely on ECC cryptographic techniques pertaining to operations over a finite group of points in which the discrete log problem applies. In order to describe the formalism for efficient two-node Diffie Hellman (DH) key generation, we must first define some notations and terminologies. A group-point is hereby denoted by a capital letter in bold font and a scalar will be presented in regular lowercase letters. Multiplication of a point by a scalar (e.g., s x P) will be referred to as an exponentiation, where s is the exponent. The intractability of a discrete log operation means that given the points P and s x P, the complexity of finding s is exponential.
The following notations are employed throughout the remainder of this paper: G -a generating group-point, used by all relevant nodes; ordG -the order of G. The private and public keys discussed here are issued by the CA to all nodes in the network. We will begin our discussion by focusing only on keys issued to Ni. As indicated above, the CA holds a pair of keys (private (d) and public (R)). By using d, ID., hi, a hash function and G, the CA establishes the pair of private and public keys issued to node i. We consider two scenarios for issuing the private key (xi), and the public key (U.) of node i. The node's private key xi, used in the following applications, can be derived by either scenarios described in this section. In the first scenario, the CA knows the node's secret keys. In this case, Ni's private key (xi), and the public value (Ui) can be generated as follows. First, the CA generates a random scalar hi and calculates hi x G. Next, the CA then generates node i's public and private keys by performing:
The CA issues the values xi and Ui to Ni, at which time Ni can establish the validity of the values issued to him by checking whether xi x G = H(ID.,U.) x U, + R. In the second scenario considered, the CA is not allowed to know the node's secret keys and Ni's private key and public key can be generated as follows. First, the node generates a random value vi and submits W = vi x G to the CA. Next, the CA generates a random hi and calculates hi x G. The CA then generates the pair of private and public keys by performing: (2) and issues the values pi and Ui to Ni. At The following sections describe, in detail, the two stages of the DoS mitigation method.
A. The Instigator Node Proving Its Validity
The specific scenario described in this case pertains to a malicious node who is attempting to drain the energy of a trusted nodes. The first step of a key establishment protocol consists of an instigator node (Alice) initiating communications with another node (Bob). We shall refer to the instigating node as a suspicious node which is required to prove its identity. We thus expect that during the first stage of the key exchange process, the majority of the energy consumed will be on Alice's part. This would mean that if a DoS attack is carried out, whereby a malicious node repeatedly attempts to generate a key with a valid node, the latter will be required to use as little energy as possible. We must assume that most of the nodes are not jeopardized; hence the instigating nodes are to be "presumed innocent until proven guilty". In other words, the amount of energy drained from Alice will be significant, yet not too high so as to deplete her battery too fast. However, if Alice is malicious, and attempts to establish keys with various nodes, she will eventually run out of energy and /or expose her malicious nature.
The method described next is based on the notion of key transport [29] using RSA [30] with e = 3. We note that e = 3 is considered sufficiently secure [3 1 ]. (Higher levels of security are satisfied by e = 216 +1 = 65537.) The following four steps constitute an ephemeral key exchange procedure that embeds the DoS mitigation mechanism:
Step 1 -Alice sends Bob her public key, nA, her identification, IDA Step 3 -Alice needs to prove that she indeed possesses the private key dA, proving to her counterpart that her identity is valid. This is true since the CA would have given this private key only to her. Let sx denote the number of bits in x, the least significant section of m. Alice needs to calculate tdA mod nA = m and send Bob x. Message m is comprised out of n bits such that n >> sx. The rest of the bits in the message will be used for the ephemeral key generation, as will later be described.
It should be noted that, in contrast to Bob (who needs to calculate 2 modular multiplications, or 17 in the worse case), Alice has to perform a computationally heavy task as dA typically consists of either 512 or 1024 bits. In the latter case she has to calculate 1536 modular multiplications, on the average, using the common square-and-multiply process. To that end, the approach proposed shifts the computational burden on the instigating node.
Step A possible solution would be to maintain a list of IDs of recent nodes that resulted in failed validation (step 2). Bob will then refrain from proceeding with key generation requests originating from these nodes. A time-out mechanism should be employed such that banning of nodes expires after a reasonable duration of time.
B. The Approached Node Proving It's Validity
If the first part of the procedure is successful, i.e., Alice has proven that she is who she claims to be, then Bob will need to do the same. However, if the first stage does not pass, Bob assumes that Alice is not valid, and he will discard the rest of the procedure.
The second stage can be realized in three different ways: (1) using key transport, (2) using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [33] , and (3) using self-certified fixed key generation [32] , [28] , [34] . We next describe each of these methods and discuss their respective advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, it will be shown that in each of the cases an ephemeral key is established, which is a primary goal.
1) Key Transport. Bob can validate itself to Alice by using the RSA key transport method, similar to that described in section IV-A. The random message m, generated by Bob, was encrypted using Alice's public key nCA and e. After sending the encrypted message t, such that t = me mod nA, Alice can decrypt the message back using her private key, dA. Eventually, both nodes share the same secret message m. The remaining bits of message m (excluding the s, least significant bits that were used in stage A) are utilized to establish an ephemeral key. For example, if the length of m is 512 and sx = 100, then there are 412 bits that can be used for authenticating Bob and establishing the ephemeral secret key. In this scenario, y will denote the 200 bits that follow x (as depicted in figure 3 ). The subsequent 212 bits of message m will be labeled z. (The lengths of the components in the message can be negotiated between the two parties.)
The following summarizes the key transport procedure considered:
Step 1 -Bob calculates SB Y dB mod nB, where y is the next LSB portion of message m.
Step 2 -Bob sends Alice his public key, nB, his identification, IDB, his certificate (issued by the CA), CRB, and SB. As described above, the certificate is the CA's signature on the association between nB and IDB. As such, CRB = [H(nB, IDB)]dCA mod ncA. Only the CA can create CRB by using its private key dcA 
(SB)e mod nB ?y (6) If true, Alice knows that the corresponding node is indeed Bob, since only he has the same data, y.The ephemeral key resulting will be denoted by KAB-fi,al = z, corresponding to the MSB of message m. Figure 4 illustrates the complete process. To complete the authentication cycle key confirmation needs to be preformed.
2) Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).: Bob can also validate himself to Alice by using ECDSA 5. The latter is a method for digital signatures, based on ECC. The elliptic curve employed by the ECDSA can be the same one used in all procedures above. The ECDSA variation proposed, utilizing the components of the message exchanged, m, is:
Step 1 -Bob generates a random number, u, calculates a public value, a point on the curve V = u G, where G is a generating group-point and calculates C, the scalar representation of point V. Next, he computes L = u-(y + dB C) mod ordG. Finally, he transmits Alice the signature pair (C, L).
Step 2 -Alice calculates h = L-1 mod ordG, q1 = y h mod ordG, and q2 = C h mod ordG. She next obtains the curve point: P = q-G + q2 V, where nB is Bob's public key, and calculates Cl, the scalar representation of point P. The algorithm concludes when Alice validates that C = Cl. If the latter holds, Bob is validated.
Step 3 -The ephemeral key resulting will be denoted by KAB-final = Z, corresponding to the MSB of message m. Figure 5 illustrates the complete process. To complete the authentication cycle key confirmation needs to be preformed.
3) Self-Certifled DH Fixed Key-Generation. One of the methods in which Bob can prove his validity to Alice is by using a self certified method similar to the ephemeral one Fig. 5 . Ephemeral key generation and denial of service mitigation using ECDSA.
described in section III-C. The ephemeral method can certainly be used, but when the primary focus is to minimize energy drainage, a self certified fixed key generation is advisable since it consists of less computations. We now go back to the notations used in section III where self certified ephemeral key generations were described.
A We shall refer to the joint fixed key shared by Alice and Bob as KAB-temp. In addition, as an integrated part of the key generation process, if the two generated keys are indeed identical, authentication is achieved. Therefore, the approached node has proven its validity to the instigator.
The goal of the entire procedure is to establish a shared joint secret key. It is highly desirable for that key to be ephemeral, i.e., two nodes generate a different key for each session established. Ephemeral key-generation is more secure and is generally preferred when time and resources permit. A selfcertified DH ephemeral key-generation is also possible ([28]), but would consume three times more energy when compared to the fixed key case. In order to establish an ephemeral key, the two nodes can utilize bits in message m, (generated by Bob) excluding the first x least significant bits. Hence, the final shared ephemeral key can be defined as
where H is a hash function and m/ is the random message m, excluding the x least significant bits (see figure 6 ).
V. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
As discussed in section III-C, a self certified ephemeral key generation can be generated without DoS mitigation. We have also shown in section IV-B three different methodologies for generating an ephemeral key for which the DoS mitigation was an embedded component. This section presents implementation results pertaining to all three methods, providing a comparison in terms of timing and energy resources.
The methodology described in stage A and all of the three methodologies discussed in stage B were implemented on the Intel Mote 2 [35] platform. The latter employs the Intel PXA271 XScale Processor running at a clock frequency ranging from 13 MHz to 416 MHz. The core frequency can be dynamically set in software, allowing the designer to carefully adjust the timing/power trade-off so as to optimize performance of a particular application. The self-certified algorithms (both fixed and ephemeral) were implemented using functions taken from the TinyECC package [23] . The latter targeted the MICA2 platform, and provided a basic library of ECC-based functions, including scalar multiplication and exponentiation operations. Customizations for the XScale processor, including 32-bit operation optimizations were carried out. In addition, supplementary functions, such as efficient Montgomery arithmetic, were added. All codes are written in NesC running on the TinyOS operating system. Nodes exchange messages using a 2.4 GHz embedded low-power radio transceiver. In all of the implementations depicted below, the clock frequency was 312MHz, scalars for key transport usage were 1024 bits, scalars for ECC based computations were 160 bits and points on the curve (for ECC based computations) were 160 bits for each of the vertices. It 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced a public key cryptographic method for preventing DoS attacks that target the draining of battery energy in WSN ephemeral key establishment. By exploiting the asymmetry in RSA signature generation, a robust approach to minimizing energy usage at the node being attacked has been proposed. Combining the DoS mitigation with self-certified ECC-based key generation yielded a highly resource-efficient security framework. Moreover, the concept developed can be applied to a wide range of additional security services that are currently not offered in WSN environments. Implementation results using the Intel Mote 2 platform indicate that the methodology is practical and efficient.
